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Abstract: This chapter examines the philosophical value of one proposal arising out of a 
specific Buddhist meditative practice: the claim that we can and ought to experience experience 
passing away. I discuss problems with broad notions of meditation and mysticism as organizing 
concepts, and aim to demonstrate by example how engaging with a specific line of thought from 
a specific meditative tradition can help to advance debates in the analytic philosophy of 
consciousness. 
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1. Introduction 
What can practices and theoretical analyses of meditation teach us about consciousness? 
And what can recent philosophical and psychological investigations of consciousness teach us 
about meditation? 
The terms “meditation” and “consciousness”, and related words in other languages, have 
each been used in many different ways. In order to begin to address the questions posed above 
effectively and in any depth, it is necessary at least initially to narrow the range of investigation. 
I will use “consciousness” to refer to “phenomenal consciousness” in the sense that that phrase 
has figured in debates in recent analytic philosophy (Block 1995; Chalmers 1995; Block 2007). 
In particular, Block (1995; 2007) has contrasted this notion of phenomenal consciousness, 
meaning what it is like for a conscious being to have some vivid experience, with a different 
notion of consciousness that refers to the availability of information for recall or report – what he 
calls “access consciousness” or “cognitive access”. With a similar kind of specificity, among the 
many practices that might be called mystical or meditative, my focus here will be on mindfulness 
practice in the context of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition of the meditation master Mahasi 
Sayadaw of Burma. 
One might expect that a review of literature on meditation and consciousness would 
adopt a broader scope, and include a number of different meditative and mystical traditions. 
There are principled reasons as well as practical ones for my narrow focus here, however. First, 
while the recent surge of empirical studies of meditation has included a few with direct relevance 
to philosophical work on consciousness (see e.g. Slagter et al. 2007; van Vugt & Slagter 2016; 
Manuello et al. 2016), little of this work itself engages directly and substantively with debates in 
the contemporary literature on consciousness. One notable series of papers by Berkovich-Ohana 
and collaborators does develop a model of consciousness (Berkovich-Ohana & Glicksohn 2014), 
apply this to categorize types of meditation (Berkovich-Ohana & Glicksohn 2017), and examine 
the same type of meditative experience of the cessation of experience that I focus on here 
(Berkovich-Ohana 2017); yet even here it is not easy to see precisely how this empirical work 
would help us make progress on the questions posed by analytic philosophers of consciousness. 
And while there have been a handful of interesting examinations of isolated philosophical issues 
in the relation of consciousness and meditation (e.g. Dreyfus & Thompson 2007; Davis & 
Thompson 2013; Thompson 2014; Chadha 2015), yet there is nothing like a developed field in 
the modern academic literature with sustained debates to be surveyed. There are, of course, 
sustained debates within the separate theoretical literatures that accompanied meditative 
practices in various religious contexts. Drawing on these traditions, and putting them into 
conversation with each other and with contemporary philosophy, can I think have great benefits 
for all sides. 
This point, however, brings us to a deeper problem with reviewing the literature on 
meditation, mysticism, and consciousness. The concept of “meditation” does not refer 
straightforwardly enough to be of use in organizing a field of research, and the concept of 
“mysticism” is even worse; this is true in the empirical realm (Ospina et al. 2007) as in the 
philosophical.1 In practice, the framing of certain categories of experiential states or traits as 
meditative, mystical, or contemplative often appeals implicitly to the sense of those doing the 
framing about which sorts of psychological development are ethically desirable. In this way, 
even with the concept of meditation, which is arguably more specific than that of mysticism, 
asking about its effects on and relations to consciousness is somewhat analagous to asking about 
the effects of exercise on health: it all depends on what you are doing. A different analogy, 
perhaps closer to home in the present context, is that it would do little good to survey debates in 
the field of consciousness studies where that was understood to include historical consciousness 
as a topic alongside phenomenal consciousness; there are interesting debates about each of these, 
but they are not debates about the same thing. The fact that a diverse array of practices such as 
thoughtful reflection on death, developing focal attention to the point of quieting thought 
entirely, or developing increased moment-to-moment awareness of all experience including 
thinking processes are all regarded as “mystical” or “meditative” does nothing to show that their 
empirical or conceptual relations to consciousness share even a family resemblance. 
Employing “meditation” and “mysticism” as organizing concepts, then has two 
problematic effects. First, it obscures aspects that are philosophically interesting about specific 
ways of being and training one’s mind. Secondly, it marks certain ways of being and training 
one’s mind (and not others) as exotic in ways that evidently serve as an implicit justification for 
their neglect by the mainstream of analytic philosophy. It is in order to counteract both of these 
trends that, instead of offering a general review, I aim here to offer a concrete demonstration of 
the philosophical benefit of surveying literature relevant to one specific philosophical proposal 
about consciousness arising from a specific meditative practice: that we can (and should) 
experience experience passing away. A more general review, I fear, would fail to make clear 
how any such proposal arising from meditative practice could really help contemporary 
philosophy of consciousness make progress on its central questions. 
When we look from the perspective of recent analytic philosophy, it may seem to us that 
the concerns with the workings of consciousness as they are framed in the Buddhist 
philosophical context are quite specific and idiosyncratic to those historical conversations. What 
needs to be appreciated is that the concerns with the workings of consciousness as they are 
framed in recent analytic philosophy will appear equally specific and idiosyncratic to that 
tradition to someone not immersed in that context. For many Buddhist philosophers, for instance, 
questions about materialism have not seemed nearly as central or important to the philosophy of 
mind or of consciousness as they have for contemporary analytic philosophers. Instead, much of 
the discussion of consciousness in the Pāli texts and in Burmese Buddhist meditation traditions is 
embedded in and responsive to a framework whose central questions have to do with which 
states of mind we ought to cultivate and which we ought to train away, a framework that analytic 
philosophers would recognize as ethical rather than metaphysical. This state of affairs need not 
put an end to conversation between the two perspectives. Rather, the fact that there are deep 
philosophical differences between the respective background aims and assumptions of these two 
traditions is one of the most important reasons to cultivate such a conversation. 
Regarding the metaphysics of mind and the ethical question of how to direct our minds, 
as in ethics more generally, really listening to and engaging respectfully with another, foreign, 
perspective can help us to see our own more clearly and to improve it (cf. Appiah 2010; 
Velleman 2015: 99). Such cosmopolitan conversations allow individuals immersed in each 
tradition to see more clearly where the blind spots of that tradition lie, to see how we might 
reframe and refine not only the answers we give to philosophical questions but also the questions 
we ask; and to refine not only the questions we ask, but also the habits of directing attention that 
give rise to certain sets of questions rather than others. This last point also brings to the fore the 
metaphilosophical significance of meditation, if we think of meditation as the intentional 
cultivation of habits of attention, and of habits of attention as giving urgency to certain sets of 
philosophical questions rather than others. 
2. Experiencing Experience Arising and Passing 
In order to contribute to the literature a concrete example of how rigorous and non-
dismissive philosophical dialogue on meditation and consciousness might go, I have chosen to 
focus on a specific philosophical proposal. This proposal is drawn from a Burmese Theravāda 
Buddhist meditation tradition that is one of the most influential in the context of meditation in 
the modern West, both in its own right and through its impact on secular Mindfulness Based 
Interventions such as Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR). In this Theravada context it 
is the term bhāvanā that is usually rendered as “meditation”. Bhāvanā refers to the intentional 
cultivation of specific types of mental states and character traits, in particular to the cultivation of 
wholesome qualities such as concentration of attention, goodwill of heart, and clear seeing of the 
characteristic nature of all experience. It is this last type of cultivation that will be of particular 
interest here. 
Perhaps the most central aim of mindfulness practice, as it is characterized in Theravāda 
Buddhist mindfulness meditation practices of Burma, is to become vividly aware of the moment 
to moment changes in subjective experience. This is referred to as the development of insight 
understanding (vipassana ñāna). In beginning stages of insight understanding, one is primarily 
aware of the moment to moment change of the contents of phenomenal consciousness, sensations 
of heat changing to sensations of cool, of experiences of hearing being followed by experiences 
of thinking (perhaps some thought triggered by the sound), and so on. To the degree meditators 
are paying attention, that is, cultivating mindfulness of these experiences, they are thus able to 
report on how experience changed; indeed this is how meditation teachers assess the 
development of students’ ability to pay mindful attention. In the terms of the recent analytic 
debates indicated above, then, experiences of heat, cool, and so on are “access conscious” – they 
are available for recall, report, and so on –  (Block 1995), but they are nonetheless only access 
conscious in virtue of being phenomenally felt. What is important and efficacious for the aim of 
mindfulness practice is not a recognition that one was previously feeling heat in the body, and is 
now is feeling coolness, or movement, or whatever other sensation. That kind of knowledge 
would require recall of and comparison with past moments. Instead, one sustains awareness of 
the texture and phenomenal feel of a sensation such as heat as that sensation fades and another 
takes its place; one is phenomenally conscious of what it is like as that sensation changes into to 
a different one rather than (just) thinking about that change.  
More interesting philosophically is the further suggestion by meditation teachers and 
practitioners that as quietude of mind and discernment deepen over the course of dedicated 
cultivation of mindfulness, one develops a fine-grained experiential awareness not only of the 
inconstant, changing nature of the contents of phenomenal consciousness, but also the 
inconstant, changing nature of phenomenal consciousness itself, the vehicle of that phenomenal 
content. This awareness, it is claimed, manifests with all modalities of phenomenal 
consciousness: seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, and also experiences of thinking, 
wondering, remembering and so.2 One comes to consciously feel each of these experiences as 
oscillating and pulsating. As this awareness deepens, one comes to see this oscillating, pulsating, 
staccato-like nature of each instance of phenomenal consciousness on more and more fine-
grained, subtle levels. At the deepest levels, it is claimed, it is possible to be experientially aware 
of discrete moments of phenomenal consciousness arising and completely passing away. 
In the course of an exciting recent exploration of Buddhist meditation and the cognitive 
neuroscience of consciousness, Lutz, Dunne, & Richardson (2007) mention a Tibetan Buddhist 
practice similar to the Burmese Mahasi method of attentiveness to conscious experience 
discussed above. In that Tibetan Buddhist practice of “Open Presence”, as Lutz, Dunne, & 
Richardson describe it, one aims to attend not to the contents of consciousness but to the 
“invariant nature of consciousness” itself (2007: 514-5). While similar in this regard to 
mindfulness of consciousness in the Mahasi tradition as I have described it above, the Tibetan 
practice of “Open Presence” differs in important ways; most crucial for our purposes is that 
whereas the Mahasi tradition aims to see consciousness itself arising and also ceasing moment 
after moment; no such aim is evident in Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson’s description of “Open 
Presence” meditation. The proposal that consciousness is broken into discrete moments is 
mentioned, as a point of agreement among various traditions of Buddhist theoretical psychology 
(Abhidharma), in Dreyfus & Thompson’s (2007) excellent recent survey of Indian Buddhist 
approaches to consciousness. As they also note, disagreements among Buddhist traditions on the 
exact time scale of these temporal units of consciousness suggest that these positions may owe 
more to theoretical development than to evidence from meditative experience. Nonetheless, the 
broad Buddhist position that consciousness can be experienced to be arising and passing on a 
momentary level is directly opposed with claims such as William James’ that, “consciousness 
does not appear to itself chopped up in bits” (James 1981: 233, as quoted in Dreyfus & 
Thompson 2007: 95).3 
In this and subsequent sections I will refer to two opposing positions on this issue as 
Unbrokenism and Brokenism. The former position claims that phenomenal consciousness is 
unbroken, at least for extended periods, such as while we are awake. Call this Metaphysical 
Unbrokenism. This has the implication that it is not possible to accurately experience 
phenomenal consciousness as broken into discrete momentary instances of consciousness. I will 
distinguish this latter claim as Epistemic Unbrokenism. An opposing set of views is held by 
certain Buddhist texts and teachers, to the effect that it is possible for a human being to 
accurately experience the arising and passing of phenomenal consciousness, that is, to be 
phenomenally conscious of phenomenal consciousness as oscillating, pulsating, having a 
staccato-like nature. Here too, we can separate two claims: first, the claim that phenomenal 
conscious is broken in this way, Metaphysical Brokenism; and second, the claim that it is 
possible – through the attentional training of mindfulness meditation – to accurately perceive the 
brokenness of consciousness, Epistemic Brokenism. Interestingly, among these four positions, 
Epistemic Brokenism is the view most directly opposed to Metaphysical Unbrokenism, since the 
claim that it is possible to accurately experience consciousness as broken implies that 
consciousness is broken (but the converse does not hold), and the view that consciousness is 
unbroken implies that it is not possible to accurately experience consciousness as broken (but the 
converse of this also does not hold). 
If true, Epistemic Brokenism offers one of the most promising avenues for experiential 
evidence from meditation to generate philosophically important questions and to challenge 
contemporary claims about consciousness. To take one example, Tye (2003: 108) says that “a 
stream of consciousness is just one temporally extended experience that represents a flow of 
things in the world. It has no shorter experiences as parts”. And again, (97) “with each 
experienced change in things and qualities, there is an experience of the change. But this does 
not necessitate that there be a new experience. The simplest hypothesis compatible with what is 
revealed by introspection is that, for each period of consciousness, there is only a single 
experience…” But, if Epistemic Brokenism is true, then Tye’s hypothesis – however 
parsimonious – is not compatible with what is revealed by introspection. Moreover, Tye puts this 
view together with a transparency thesis to the effect that we cannot introspect experience itself, 
we can only introspect the properties of the objects experience represents. According to 
Epistemic Brokenism, however, while one can experience (successive) moments of seeing as 
themselves oscillating, pulsating, arising and passing in a staccato, discontinuous manner, this 
experienced discontinuity of consciousness is not experienced as representing any feature of the 
object being seen. 
Of course, there are ample reasons to doubt the reliability of introspective awareness in 
general. So if the majority of human beings (including Tye, for one) do not feel their experiences 
of seeing, hearing and so on as having an oscillating, pulsating, staccato-like nature, when some 
(self-)selected group of people does claim to experience these commonplace phenomenal 
experiences in this remarkably different way, perhaps we are justified in eyeing Epistemic 
Brokenism with suspicion. Interestingly, there is a way in which the general unreliability of 
introspection may actually help the case for meditators’ claims to introspective accuracy. 
Schwitzgebel’s (2011) recent raft of critiques, to take a leading instance, are directed at the 
“naïve” introspection of “most” people. And he points out (2011: 118) that some Eastern 
meditative traditions combine an endorsement of this general skepticism about conclusions from 
untrained introspection with an optimism about properly attentive kinds of introspective 
awareness. Indeed the Theravāda Buddhist claims for Metaphysical and Epistemic Brokenism 
employ a tactic closely parallel to Schwitzgebel’s arguments from error. He notes that “through 
more careful and thoughtful introspection, [subjects] seem to discover — I think they really do 
discover — that visual experience does not consist of a broad, stable field, flush with precise 
detail, hazy only at the borders. They discover that, instead, the center of clarity is tiny, shifting 
rapidly around a rather indistinct background. Most of my interlocutors confess to error in 
having originally thought otherwise” (Schwitzgebel 2011: 126). Similarly, by developing 
mindfulness, meditators take themselves to discover that their phenomenal experiences do 
actually have an oscillating, pulsating, staccato-like arising and passing away nature, and take 
themselves along with most everyone else to have been in error in originally perceiving these 
experiences as an unbroken flow of experience. That is, they go beyond Epistemic Brokenism as 
I have defined them above – the claim that it is possible to accurately experience the arising and 
passing of consciousness – to make the further claim that through such experience one corrects 
the naïve and erroneous view that phenomenal consciousness is continuous. 
The early Buddhist discourses describe perversions (vipallāsa) of perception (saññā), 
thought (citta), and view (diṭṭhi) that reinforce one another, and offer mindfulness meditation as 
a means to counteract these perversions at the foundational level of perception (such as seeing 
consciousness as continuous) and to come to perceive rightly (such as seeing consciousness as 
discontinuous).4 Evan Thompson and I have drawn on such texts and on the fast-growing body 
of empirical research to offer a two-part model of mindfulness, as involving on the one hand 
increases in generalized awareness, and on the other decreases in affective biases of attention 
(especially in Davis & Thompson 2014; see also Davis & Thompson 2013). To bolster claims for 
the accuracy of experiences of the discontinuity generated through mindfulness practice, one 
might appeal to results demonstrating that mindfulness practice improves subjects’ ability to 
detect and report on rapidly present visual stimuli (Slagter et al. 2007), predicts introspective 
accuracy (Fox et al. 2012), is correlated with more accurate first-person reports about emotional 
physiological response (Sze et al. 2010), is associated with decreased mind wandering (Brewer et 
al. 2011), and attenuates affective biases of attention and memory (Roberts-Wolfe et al. 2012; 
van Vugt et al. 2012). 
Nonetheless, one alternative would be to suggest that rather than involving the correction 
of an error, the process of mindfulness meditation might instead serve to break up a stream of 
consciousness that was in fact continuous during an earlier period, and accurately perceived to be 
so. A different proposal from a generally anti-realist approach to consciousness would be to 
suggest that apart from the fact that things seem a certain way to me, there is no further thing 
“the seeming” whose continuity or discontinuity we could be correct or incorrect about (cf. 
Dennett 1991: 364). At its most charitable towards Brokenism, such a (broadly, anti-realist) view 
might allow that in the earlier period the ways things seemed to me (itself) seemed to me 
continuous, and grant that in the latter that the ways things seemed to me (itself) seemed to me 
discontinuous, but then insist that is all there is to say; there is no further question about whether 
conscious experience actually was continuous or discontinuous. Many, likely most, anti-realist 
theorists would likely go further and hold that to talk of the way things seem to me as itself 
seeming a certain way (continuous, or instead arising and passing, or whatever else) is to fall into 
a confusion.  
Meditative experience of arising and passing in mindfulness practice might have 
implications for these debates about the metaphysics of consciousness. For instance, if I take 
myself to have experienced phenomenal consciousness itself as oscillating, pulsating, having a 
staccato-like arising and passing nature, then I will likely be motivated to find a way of talking 
that makes sense of this possibility. For that reason, one might be compelled to reject any 
(including anti-realist) accounts that would not make sense of such an experience. Possibly, one 
might be compelled to go further and endorse the ontological independence of phenomenal 
consciousness from the experience or introspection of it. Of course, these implications could be 
resisted, for instance through various strategies of explaining away subjects’ sense that they are 
indeed phenomenally conscious of phenomenal consciousness arising and passing. 
 
3. Nonself and Consciousness 
It is often claimed that by mindfully investigating experience and finding no aspect of 
experience that lasts, meditators come to the realization that there is no lasting self. And this 
metaphysical conclusion, in turn, is often held to have ethical implications: if suffering is 
ownerless, then all of it ought to be avoided equally (see e.g. Goodman 2009, Siderits 2003). Yet 
a number of recent authors have appealed to philosophical considerations about meditation to 
reject this dominant interpretation. 
Miri Albahari, for one, has offered a novel and creative interpretation on which the 
descriptions found in the early Buddhist Pāli suttas support a view on which the contents of 
consciousness that we identify with are impermanent, but the witness consciousness which 
directly experiences these changing contents is impersonal and ownerless, and also ever-present 
and unbroken. “When the Pāli sutras speak of consciousness as being impermanent, I take this to 
mean that the intentional content of consciousness – that to which consciousness is directed – is 
constantly changing,” she writes (Albahari 2011: 95). The proposal that the notion of viññāṇa 
employed in the Pāli suttas amounts to an unbroken witness consciousness would, if correct, 
reveal an underappreciated convergence with Advaita-Vedanta claims about the understanding 
that emerges from meditative experience, as Albahari (2002) notes. Secondly, the considerations 
she raises would move us away from the standard reductionist, “bundle-theory” interpretation of 
non-self (anattā) in the Pāli Buddhist texts as a metaphysical denial of the self, and towards an 
understanding of the claims for anattā as a practical strategy for reducing identification with the 
contents of consciousness. 
Albahari notes that on standard Theravada Buddhist interpretations of the Pāli suttas, 
such as that of the meditation master Mahasi Sayadaw mentioned above, meditators must be 
experientially aware of the arising and passing nature of consciousness itself (Albahari 2011: 94-
5). Indeed, it is by seeing even consciousness itself arising and passing that meditators are said to 
arrival at the conclusion that there is no self. Yet, interestingly, she charges this Brokenist 
proposal with incoherence. As she puts the point in an earlier manuscript (Albahari 2007: 45), if 
the discerning mind were impermanent, “such a mind, in order to directly experience (and hence 
know) its own impermanence, would have to be percipient of its own fleeting nature. That means 
it would have to be present while it directly discerns its own fleeting moments of absence (as 
well as presence). But then if present to its own absence, it cannot actually be absent during 
those moments; we arrive at a contradiction.” 
Moreover, Albahari contends that even if we were to allow numerically distinct moments 
of consciousness, there would no phenomenological way to discern between the condition in 
which consciousness is unbroken and that in which it is broken. 
…the observational component, which renders each moment of non-reflexive 
consciousness to be conscious, is qualitatively invariant, leaving no marker by which the 
contiguous numerical transition could be experientially discerned (it’s not as if there will 
be a little jolt at each transition). The observational component to each conscious moment 
will thus seem, from the first person experiential perspective, to be unbroken – regardless 
of the underlying ontology. (Albahari 2011: 97) 
If Albahari is right about this, Epistemic Brokenism fails even if we grant Metaphysical 
Brokenism. 
Traditional Theravada Buddhist proponents of Metaphysical and Epistemic Brokenism 
have some responses in store, however. First, they suggest in effect that – contra Albahari – there 
is “a little jolt” that will be experienced as advanced meditators become aware of the passing of 
one moment of consciousness, and the arising of another. This is precisely because, it is said, one 
directly experiences the cessation of (a momentary instance of) consciousness. This is 
experienced as a type of cessation that has been happening all along, in each moment, rather than 
something newly brought about by the meditative observation. And this is why, although 
consciousness is qualitatively invariant, one no longer regards it as an unbroken witnessing self, 
even an impersonal one. It is because we are not normally phenomenologically conscious of this 
cessation that we can correct our views by experiencing it through the training of mindful 
attention to more and more precise awareness. 
Secondly, the classical commentarial manual Visuddhimagga (Path of Purification) 
suggests that after comprehending the impermanent (anicca), uneasy (dukkha), non-self (anattā) 
nature of physical phenomena (such as heat and cool in the body), the meditator comprehends 
that consciousness too (the one that had been contemplating the physical phenomena) as itself 
impermanent, uneasy, and non-self, by means of a subsequent consciousness.5 Moreover, one 
can comprehend this second consciousness itself as impermanent, uneasy, and non-self by means 
of a third instance of consciousness, the third by means of a fourth, and so on.6 So an initial 
response to Albahari is simply to question her use of the term ‘it’ to subsume multiple 
numerically distinct moments of consciousness into a single substance ‘mind’, thereby 
generating the paradox of the mind being aware of its own passing. Once we distinguish 
preceding and succeeding instances of consciousness, there is no incoherence in supposing that 
the latter can take as its object the absence of the preceding moment of consciousness. 
It might be more problematic to insist that the subsequent consciousness comprehends 
not only the absence of the former, but also the process of its passing, or to say that the 
subsequent consciousness directly experiences the qualities of the preceding one – for instance 
experiences the preceding instance of consciousness as impermanent, uneasy, and non-self. To 
feel the ‘jolt’ of the cessation of one instance of consciousness or the arising of another would 
seem to require one instance of consciousness being aware of another, with both existing in some 
sense at the same time. This would be problematic if we were also to take on a strong form of 
another commitment that these traditional authors do subscribe to, namely the idea that there can 
only be one distinct instance of consciousness at a time. However, this particular notion of 
momentariness is not explicit in the Pāli suttas to which Albahari refers, and it is not clear 
philosophically that the account ought to be committed to such a principle. This committemtn is 
present in the later commentaries on these early suttas, and Mahasi Sayadaw (2016: 364-5) does 
follow the commentarial commitment to this principle. He also follows the Visuddhimagga in 
suggesting that one apprehends a moment of consciousness by means of a subsequent one. He 
notes that the paradox generated by these two commitments (roughly the one Albahari raises) is 
also mentioned in the commentaries as a topic of debate. But Mahasi suggests that this paradox 
can be resolved by a further suggestion he finds in the commentaries to the effect that the 
experience of the immediately preceding moment of consciousness remains vivid enough to be 
the target of the present moment of consciousness. So there are multiple avenues open that each 
would resolve the worry Albahari raises. If we understand mindfulness practice as involving an 
impermanent instance of consciousness taking as its object another impermanent instance of 
consciousness – either a concurrent instance in the process of ceasing, or else (as the Mahasi 
tradition suggests) the still vivid experience of the moment of consciousness that has just ceased 
– then the contradiction Albahari points out does not arise.  
For the reasons given above, I think that neither practical experience in mindfulness 
meditation nor textual evidence from Pāli suttas offer us reason to take phenomenal 
consciousness as unbroken – both suggest, on the contrary, that we ought to take phenomenal 
consciousness as discontinuous and thus impermanent.7 For that reason the convergence 
Albahari sees between Buddhist and Advaita-Vedanta accounts is, I think, illusory. Nonetheless, 
these points should not distract us from what is right about Albahari’s overall approach to the 
doctrine of non-self (anattā). Albahari and I share an aim of respecting and incorporating the 
epistemic value on direct experience over mere reasoning, a value found in various Buddhist 
practice traditions. Indeed, my overall strategy, like Albahari’s, is to appeal to considerations 
from meditative practice and from the early Pāli suttas to show what is wrong with the kind of 
abstract, metaphysical approaches to the doctrine of non-self (anattā) arguably adopted later 
Theravada Buddhist commentators, and more explicitly by recent analytic philosophers. In 
particular, I have agreed with Albahari that in the context of the Pāli suttas, anattā is better 
understood as a practical strategy for not taking experience personally than as a reductionist 
metaphysical claim about persons. The gist of my argument (see Davis 2016) is that the anatta 
doctrine amounts to the claim that every aspect of experience can be seen to be impersonal and 
out of our control. Crucially, this is a perspective we can – and can only – take up from within 
our own subjective perspective. 
In order to establish the further, metaphysical claim for reductionism or eliminitavism 
about persons, later Buddhist interpreters (e.g. Nāgasena in the Milindapañha) and recent 
analytical philosophers (e.g. Parfit 1982) take up perspective on persons from the outside. It is 
only from that sort of a perspective that we can regard pleasure and pain, perceptions and 
consciousness as objects in the world that could make up persons. But this is not the perspective 
that is cultivated by mindfulness meditation, as it is described in the Pāli discourses or as it is 
taught by contemporary practitioners such as the Mahasi Sayadaw. Rather than abstracting away 
from one’s individual perspective, I take the Pāli discourses and the Mahasi Sayadaw to be 
encouraging each of us instead to inhabit more fully our own subjective experience of the world 
(Davis 2016).  My point is not that one cannot adopt a third person perspective on consciousness 
as such. Rather, I want to argue these traditions are suggesting that we should not, at least for the 
purposes of understanding non-self. Instead, we are to understand the anattā doctrine as a claim 
that by inhabiting our experience more fully we come to see each aspect of experience – 
including consciousness itself – as transitory, uneasy, and impersonal. And that is all that needs 
to done. 
One might adopt the further premise that that is all there is to a person, metaphysically, 
and thereby conclude that ultimately there are no persons; as I understand the doctrine of anattā 
in the Pāli discourses, however, no stand is taken on either issue this further premise or this 
further conclusion. Rather, seeing each aspect of experience – including consciousness itself – as 
transitory, uneasy, and impersonal is all that there is to be done, ethically. The project of the 
Buddha in the Pāli discourses requires no more than this – and also no less.8 
 
4. On the Very Idea of Experiencing Arising and Passing 
Central to my discussions above has been the possibility that one can be phenomenally 
conscious of phenomenal conscious arising and passing. I have noted that the Mahasi tradition of 
mindfulness practice takes its goal to be experiencing the momentary cessation of phenomenal 
consciousness, along with its contents. And I have detailed how the claims made in this context 
for the possibility of such experiences – what I have called Epistemic Brokenism – has a number 
of philosophically important implications for the metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology of 
consciousness. 
However, as I have noted in passing, many anti-realist approaches to phenomenal 
consciousness emphasize that while there are ways things seem to us, the idea that there are thus 
seemings is a mistake. On such a view, it would seem to make little sense to speak of 
phenomenal consciousness as a thing of the sort that we could be phenomenally conscious of 
arising and passing. Perhaps the most interesting, rigorous, and sustained critique of this kind in 
the context of Buddhist meditation has been by Robert Sharf. In earlier work, Sharf (1995; 2000) 
charged that modern presentations that cast mindfulness as a type of bare attention leading to 
discrete, replicable, experiential realizations – he notes in particular the experience of cessation 
claimed in the Mahasi tradition – are problematic on a number of historical, sociological, and 
philosophical levels. Sharf claims that the emphasis given by Mahasi Sayadaw and others to 
rapid progress through meditative experiences, without study of Buddhist theory or deep 
concentrative practice, is a novel innovation not evidenced in premodern Asia. However, this 
point rest on an equivocation about historical periods. Even if such an emphasis on meditative 
experience over theoretical study is not attested to in the centuries immediately predating the 
modern mediation movement, this possibility is attested to in the early Buddhist texts in the Pāli 
Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas not only in theoretical discussions of insight without deep 
concentration and also in stories of individuals attaining the goal rapidly and without theoretical 
study.9 Secondly, Sharf notes sociological evidence that there are debates within and between 
traditions over whose experiences of cessation are the ‘real’ ones. This, I think, does present a 
more serious difficulty. Yet in Sharf’s argument this point serves merely as circumstantial 
evidence for what is really a philosophical conclusion, that while different meditators may take 
themselves to be referring to the same discrete experience as each other when they make these 
claims, these claims may in fact be operating not referentially but instead performatively, in the 
service of legitimizing particular authority structures. 
Sharf ties his critique of such claims for discrete shared meditative experiences – such as 
the experience of experience ceasing – to a more general philosophical critique, that the notion of 
bare attention as accessing conscious experience independent of conception and judgment 
requires the type of problematic picture of the mind that Dennett calls the “Cartesian theater” and 
Rorty calls “the mirror of nature”. Noting these philosophical inspirations, Sharf gives a nod as 
well to Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Derrida. In recent work Sharf also 
locates a line of critique within early Chinese Buddhist tradition that is closely aligned with his 
own. Describing the general position of the “subitists” in early Chinese Buddhism, who argued 
that enlightenment is sudden, Sharf (2014: 951-952) writes that these thinkers “reject any 
articulation of the path and any form of practice that takes the terms “mind” and “mindfulness” 
as referencing discrete and determinable states or objects or meditative experiences. For the 
Chan subitists, like the modern antifoundationalists, the image of the mind as mirror epitomizes a 
widespread but ultimately wrongheaded understanding of mind, cognition, and our relationship 
to the world.” The metaphysical implication Sharf’s version of this critique is that while modern 
meditators might take their experiences – such as of experience arising and passing – to be 
presenting the way consciousness really is, independent of any socially conditioned theoretical 
framework, this is a misconception. 
Here again, I think the Mahasi tradition has resources to respond with. First, the evidence 
for the Mahasi tradition being committed to the mirror analogy, as Sharf conceives of it, is 
weak.10 Nonetheless, it is plausible that the Mahasi tradition and the Theravāda more generally 
are committed to a philosophical distinction that Sharf would reject, between phenomenal 
consciousness itself and conceptualizations through which it is interpreted. I have elsewhere 
raised the possibility that the distinction between viññāṇa and saññā in these Buddhist contexts 
might map closely the distinction that analytic philosophers such as Block (1995; 2007) draw 
between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. Mahasi himself was obviously 
committed to some distinction between viññāṇa and saññā. However, it is less clear that his 
characterization of mindfulness was predicated on this. On the other hand it might be that in their 
characterization of bare awareness, modernist interpreters of the Mahasi tradition do assume 
some distinction along the lines of Block’s phenomenal versus cognitive. If so, and if Block’s 
opponents were to establish that this distinction is a mistake, that might count as well against 
such modernist presentations of mindfulness. However, the debate between realism and anti-
realism about phenomenal consciousness is very much a live controversy, and if modernist 
interpretations of mindfulness cast their lot with Block, it is hardly clear that they have chosen 
the losing side. Secondly, although on an anti-realist view it would make little sense to speak of 
consciousness as a thing that can arise and pass away, this implication may be turned against the 
anti-realist. Thus one might suggest, in light of meditative experience, that since we evidently 
can be phenomenally conscious of phenomenal consciousness ceasing, this serves as evidence 
against anti-realist views of consciousness, if they cannot make sense of this possibility. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to demonstrate by example the value of bringing into 
conversation different traditions of investigating consciousness. I have focused especially on the 
philosophical interest of one claim found in the Mahasi tradition, among others, the proposal that 
it is possible for a human being to be phenomenally conscious of phenomenal consciousness as 
broken, arising and passing on a momentary level. Even in this area of focus, many, many 
questions remain. I do not hope to have demonstrated that the Mahasi tradition is correct in 
making this claim, much less that the questions raised in such an attempt are easy ones. On the 
contrary, my aim has been to show that the attempt to make sense of this aspect of meditative 
experience forces us to confront deep and difficult philosophical questions, and is capable of 
bringing fresh perspectives to bear on contemporary philosophical debates about the nature of 
consciousness. Indeed, I see the engagement between Buddhist meditative traditions and 
contemporary debates in academic philosophy, if it is done with mutual respect and with (what 
may amount to the same) a mutual willingness to question foundational assumptions, as capable 
of bringing immense benefits for both. 
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1 Indeed, perhaps the singlemost relevant, sustained debate in the existing literature is on 
the viability of mystical experience as a organizing concept; as detailed below, Sharf (2000) not 
only raises skeptical worries of this sort in regard to mysticism and meditation in general, he also 
expresses skeptical doubts as to whether there are discrete meditative experiences shared even 
among meditators in a single tradition. 
2 I intend this characterization to be entirely neutral on the question of whether there is 
distinctive cognitive phenomenology. 
3 In another recent article on “meditation and unity of consciousness” Chadha (2015) 
primarily discusses synchronic unity of consciousness, rather than diachronic unity as I do here, 
and (perhaps for this reason) draws mainly on the Yogācāra Buddhist tradition. For these reasons, 
the question of meditative experience of the cessation of consciousness, and the philosophical 
implications of this diachronic disunity, are not a focus of her discussion. 
4 See e.g. Vipallāsa Sutta, Aṅguttara Nikāya II 52, in the Pali Text Society edition. 
5 Visuddimagga XX 79. 
6 Visuddimagga XX 80-81. 
7 A note on exegetical approach: The Pali texts contain passages that leave room for 
multiple interpretations. Arguably, this leaves room for tying the nature of (some aspects of) 
viññāṇa closely to the nature of nibbāna along the general lines that Albahari suggests, and from 
which she moves to the conclusion that viññāṇa, like nibbāna, is unconditioned, and therefore not 
impermanent. Nonetheless, there is at least as good textual and philosophical reason to move in 
																																																						
																																																																																																																																																																														
the opposite direction, from the premise that viññāṇa is conditioned and impermanent, to the 
conclusion that it cannot be equated with nibbāna in the ways Albahari suggests. 
8 Indeed, the path of practice outlined in the Theravāda requires the cultivation of a 
certain kind of broken heartedness that arises through seeing Metaphysical Brokenness. In 
technical terms, this is the disenchantment (nibbidhā) that arises through being phenomenally 
conscious of the arising and passing of every aspect of experience – including phenomenal 
consciousness itself. By seeing each of these aspects of as arising and passing and out of our 
control, the tradition maintains, one abandons the implicit and misguided hope that any aspect of 
experience will give us lasting pleasure, and thereby finds a relief and freedom unavailable 
through pursuit of any kind of content of experience. The tradition thus takes a position in value 
theory that builds on and moves beyond Metaphysical Brokenism (the claim that all aspects of 
experience, including consciousness itself, are rapidly arising and passing) and further, beyond 
Epistemic Brokenism (the claim that is possible to accurately experience this broken nature of 
consciousness and all other aspects of experience), to an ethical claim that we might call Heart 
Brokenism: the claim that we ought to experience the arising and passing away of consciousness 
itself because of the emotional release that that brings from the psychological causes of 
suffering. 
9 See for instance the story of Bāhiya Daruciriyo (at Udāna 6ff,a in the Pali Text Society 
edition), among others. 
10 Sharf (2014: 951) notes versions of what he takes to be the mirror analogy as illustrating 
“the essential and unchanging nature of mind on the one hand and the transient, ephemeral, and 
ultimately unreal nature of what appears in the mind on the other. The reflections that appear on 
the surface of the mirror, whether beautiful or ugly, defiled or pure, leave the mirror’s true nature 
																																																																																																																																																																														
unsullied.” The Mahasi tradition takes the opposite position on both of these points, however. The 
mind is neither originally pure nor unchanging. As we have discussed in detail above, the Mahasi 
claim for Epistemic Brokenism, to the effect that we can see all aspects of mind, including 
consciousness itself, passing away moment after moment, is precisely to be free of the mistaken 
perception of consciousness as unbroken.  
